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The main contribution of this study is to understand how episodes of restrictive monetary 
policy have different impacts on long-term interest rates. These impacts are decomposed 
into changes in real neutral interest rates, long-run expected inflation and risk premium. For 
a sub-sample, the latter is further decomposed into inflationary risks and other 
macroeconomic risks. More specifically, this study aims at analyzing periods of recent 
restrictive monetary policies, such as those of September 2002, June 2004 and April 2008. 
The results show that changes in the risk premium are the major factor driving long-run 
forward rates and that real neutral interest rates play a secondary role.  
 
 
Key words: Term structure of interest rates; Forward rates decomposition, Financial 
markets and the macroeconomy; Monetary policy 
 





1 - Introduction 
The relation between short- and long-term interest rates has been the focus of interest for 
academics and practitioners. Some of this importance is due to the capacity of the term 
structure to capture possible rates of reinvestment, and the fact that relevant information on 
macroeconomic variables is embedded in it. Many studies approach this topic and try to 
analyze such implicit information: see, for example, Estrella (2005) and Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (2004). In those articles, the authors claim that the term structure has the ability to 
predict some macroeconomic variables, mainly future output growth and inflation.  
Conversely, other studies try to analyze the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the 
term structure. Wu (2003) shows that the contractionary monetary policy has a significant 
but short-term effect on the term structure. The term structure flattens in response to a 
restrictive monetary policy. A positive shock of the output raises bond returns, and its 
magnitude is similar across different maturities; however, the scale is smaller if compared 
with monetary policy. 
This study aims to describe the impact of monetary policy on the term structure of 
interest rates in different episodes of monetary policy tightening in the Brazilian economy. 
It uses as a methodological basis the contribution of Kozicki and Sellon (2005), who 
investigate the yield curve responses of monetary policy tightening over some decades in 
the United States. Specifically, it attempts to elucidate the uncommon result of a long-term 
interest rate fall to an increase in rates between 2004 and 2005, known as a conundrum. For 
this purpose, a comparison is made with another period of monetary tightening that has not 
presented such an effect, that is, the episode of monetary contraction between 2002 and 
2003. The analysis aims at identifying what has in fact motivated such a fall in interest 
rates: a variation in the expected inflation, a variation in the expected real interest rates or 
other sources of alteration of the perceived risk by economic agents. 
Many other studies relate monetary policy and the yield curve of emerging 
economies. By comparing some countries, Garcia and Lowenkron (2005) find that Brazil is 
one of the few countries in which short-term inflationary surprises affect medium-term 
expectations. In the light of the theory of systemic risk developed by De La Torre and 3 
 
Schmukler (2004) analyze the experience of three emerging countries (Mexico, Israel and 
Poland) that achieved success in their stabilization process, and the study concludes that the 
inflation reduction was linked to a fall in the real interest rate, which resulted in a 
significant fall in the nominal interest rates. These facts led not only to lengthening debt 
maturity but also to a changing debt profile, which became pre-fixed.  
Besides this section, the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methodology used, as well as the data, and shows the preliminary results. Section 3 
displays a brief explanation of the episodes of monetary tightening in the period studied. 
Section 4 aims at highlighting the determinant factors of the variations in the long part of 
the term structure. Section 5 presents the conclusion of this study. 
2 – Decomposition methodology 
The main instrument for analysis will be the decomposition of the term rate into one 
and two years. The variation of this rate will then be decomposed into several components 
with a direct economic interpretation. The methodology presented here closely follows the 
one adopted by Sellon and Kozicki (2005), in which the analysis of impacts of monetary 
policies on the long-term changes is based on the decomposition of the interest rate into its 
principal components. The first decomposition occurs with the use of spot rates from 
different periods to obtain the term rate. Mathematically speaking, we can decompose the 
two-year yield as follows:  
  21 , 1 2 f ii i → = +  (1.1) 
where  2 i  is the log of one plus the two-year interest rate,  1 i  is the log of one plus the one-
year interest rate and  ,1 2 f i →  is the log of one plus the forward interest rate from years one to 
two.          
  Figure 1 plots the short-term interest rate (Selic) and the forward rate from years one 
to two. The graph shows that, in principle, there is no direct relationship between these two 
rates but forward rates tend to anticipate the increases in the short-term rates. This idea 
comes from the idea that forward rates reflect the market expectation for future short-term 4 
 
rates, an idea explored in many studies (see for instance Fama, 2006 and Campbell, 1995). 
However, instead of exploring the direct relationship between the short-term interest rate 
and the forward rate, we take an alternative approach using Sellon and Kozicki’s (2005) 
method to understand what the main components of the forward rate are.  
[ FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ] 
We further break down the forward rate found in the previous process. It is the sum 
of a rate called the neutral interest rate and a risk premium associated with the bond 
because the longer-term rates should not be influenced by short-term cycles. The forward 
rate can be decomposed into: 
  ,1 2 fn ii ρ → = +  (1.2) 
where  n i  is the neutral nominal interest rate, though as a long-term equilibrium nominal 
rate, and  ρ  is the risk premium. 
  Further, the neutral nominal interest rate can be broken into the real interest rate,  n r , 
and the expected long-term inflation rate, 
e π . Similarly, we split the risk premium into two 
parts, inflationary risk,  π ρ , and other macroeconomic fundamental risks,  f ρ : 
  ,1 2
e
f nf ir π π ρρ → = +++ (1.3). 
  The economic interpretation of equation (1.3) is quite intuitive. Thinking of the 
forward rate as the expected short-term interest rate in the future, it is explained by four 
main economic sources: the real interest rate, which is the economy’s long-term return on 
capital; the expected inflation and inflation risk, which will crucially depend on the 
monetary policy credibility; and, finally, other fundamental risks, such as liquidity, 
economic crisis and default among others not related to monetary policy. 
As a proxy for the long-term nominal interest rate and the expected inflation rate, 
we used the longest expectations available respectively for the monetary policy short-term 5 
 
interest rate and inflation. The source for these pieces of information was the “Focus” 
survey, which is a market expectations survey conducted by the Central Bank of Brazil. 
Real neutral interest rates are just the difference between neutral nominal interest rates and 
inflation expectations.  
Using equation (1.2), the risk premium is computed as the difference between the 
forward rate and the nominal neutral interest rate. The risk premium is further decomposed 
into inflationary and fundamental risks. The first is the difference between the yield of 
zero-coupon government nominal bonds and non-indexed bonds, where we added to the 
latter the corresponding expected inflation for that maturity. The indexed bond utilized was 
the NTB-B because of its greater data availability; we used the Nelson and Siegel (1987) 
method to interpolate the NTN-B curve to determine fixed one- and two-year maturities. 
The fundamental risks part of the risk premium can be obtained by subtracting the risk 
premium from the inflationary risk. 
Using the method just described, we decompose the forward rates,  ,1 2 f i → , as 
illustrated in equation (1.3). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the short-term, one-
year and two-year interest rates, the forward rate from one to two years and its respective 
decomposition into real neutral rate, long-term expected inflation and risk premium. Notice 
that the decomposition of the risk premium into inflationary and fundamentals risk is 
performed for just a sample, for the reason of a lack of data. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 We can see some interesting facts in Table 1. First, regarding the short-term, one 
year and two-year interest rates, yields and volatility increase with maturity. Second, the 
forward rate is the most volatile of all and, looking at it is decomposition, most of its 
volatility comes from the risk premium.
1 Third, the presence of high interest rates in Brazil 
for the 2002–2009 period does not seem to rely on high expected inflation rates, but has 
                                                 
1 Volatilities for the inflation risk premium and the fundamentals risk premium are much lower due to the fact 
that their sub-sample excludes the year of 2002 and most of 2003, periods of very high volatility in the 
Brazilian economy. 6 
 
much more to do with high real neutral rates and a high risk premium, a fact that deserves 
further investigation.
2 
3 – Episodes of monetary policy tightening 
  We define as monetary tightening episodes periods where the monetary policy 
interest rate increased by at least 100 basis points. Given this definition, we found three 
tightening episodes in our sample: October 2002 to February 2003, with a total increase of 
850 basis points; September 2004 to May 2005, with a total increase of 375 basis points; 
and April 2008 to September 2008, with a total increase of 250 basis points.  
  [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]   
Table 2 shows the monetary policy episodes in detail. Each episode is divided into three 
dates according to the dates of the monetary policy committee meeting: the initial date, the 
day before the first meeting at which interest rates were increased; the mid-point, the 
median consecutive increase of interest rates; and the date of the final meeting with an 
increase in interest rates. 
  The 2002–2003 monetary policy tightening 
In the 2002–2003 episode, the tough monetary tightening of 850 points caused a 
sharp decrease in the two-year interest rates and forward rates, respectively 472 and 814 
basis points. Looking at the forward rate decomposition, we see that this fall was caused by 
a sharp decrease in the risk premium. Interestingly, the monetary policy was not tough 
enough to decrease the market expected long-run inflation, which actually increased by 292 
basis points.  
This event may be explained by the fact that the credibility of the Brazilian 
authorities was being tested, that is, there was still some suspicion on the part of the market 
agents of the Brazilian Central Bank’s commitment to maintaining monetary orthodoxy. 
After the monetary policy had remained highly restrictive for nearly four months, the 
                                                 
2 For instance, one hypothesis could be the presence of high government expenditure depressing private 
consumption; however, we leave this theme for further research.   7 
 
“market” started believing that the maintenance of high interest rates would restrain 
inflation pressures at the time, even at a high political cost and low economic growth. From 
June 2003 to the end of 2003, short-term interest rates began a huge drop of 1,000 basis 
points. Contemporaneously, long-run expected inflation decreased almost continuously 
from February 2003 to December 2003, finishing the year at 5%.  
In the same period, a very significant fall in the embedded risk premium in the term 
rate is observed, which also reflects that the policy adopted by the monetary authorities was 
in fact on “the right path,” in the vision of the market agents, because they were willing to 
accept a smaller risk premium in relation to the period prior to the beginning of the policy 
tightening. Finally, at the end of the tightening period, there was a revision of the neutral 
real rate with an increase more than proportional to the previous fall. 
  The 2004 – 2005 monetary policy tightening 
  Similarly to the previous episode, the increase in interest rates caused a decrease in 
the two-year interest rates and the forward rates. However, with a striking difference, we 
observed a conundrum effect with the full rotation of the term structure: short-term interest 
rates started lower and finished higher than the long-run two-year interest rates. Everything 
points to an increase in the credibility of policies adopted by the Central Bank, which may 
have happened due to the successful containment of inflation rates in the previous monetary 
policy tightening. 
  There was a fall in the expected inflation of 0.40% – reaffirming the market’s 
confidence in the Central Bank’s capability of restraining the price level. The risk premium 
decreased by 225 basis points and the risk real neutral rate increased by 102 basis points. 
We interpret this result as the market starting to expect higher real rates in relation to the 
Central Bank’s more orthodox policy. 
  The 2008 monetary policy tightening 
  In the 2008 monetary tightening, the Brazilian economy was in a quite different 
scenario from the two other episodes. The country had just had four consecutive years with 8 
 
strong growth rates averaging 4.5%, the highest in the last 20 years, and the short-term 
interest rates were at their lowest historical value since the beginning of the inflation-
targeting regime in mid-1999. However, inflation rates started to increase due to signs of 
the economy over-heating and external price shocks on commodities.  
  In response to increasing inflation rates, the Central Bank started to increase interest 
rates in April and had its last increase in September. The response of the two-year interest 
rates and the forward rates was opposite to the past two other episodes, with an increase in 
the two-year interest rates and forward rates. The risk premium fell by 67 basis points; 
however, real neutral rates and expected inflation rates increased.  
  Our interpretation is that this episode did not have the full effect of a monetary 
policy tightening episode. The reason for this is the fact that the movement was interrupted 
by the deepening of the international financial crises that started in the U.S. mortgage 
market in mid-2008. The last month, September, was the month of the deepening of the 
global stock-exchange crashes around the world with the bankruptcy of the Lehman 
Brothers investment bank.  
4 - Determinant factors of the forward rate 
  The decomposition of the term rate allows us to observe its evolution and the 
evolution of its components, the neutral real rate, expected inflation and risk premium. In 
Figure 2, the decomposition is plotted for the full sample. Figure 3 uses our sub-sample and 
breaks the risk premium into the inflationary risk and the macroeconomic fundamentals 
risk. The complete decomposition, illustrated by Figure 3, uses data starting on October 21, 
2003, due to the lack of enough information to estimate post-fixed rates for previous 
periods. 
[INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE ] 
As it stands out in Figures 2 and 3, the risk premium and the real neutral rate seem 
to be the main factors to explain the forward rate oscillations. However, in order to obtain 
more precise evidence for this, we proceed to some formal statistical analysis. For this 9 
 
purpose, we study the statistical properties of each factor by running diagnostic tests. 
Namely, we first test for the stationarity of the series and then look for cointegration 
relationships of each series with the forward rate. Finally, we run individual regressions of 
each factor to the forward rate in order to identify which one best describes the evolution of 
forward rates.  
To perform the regressions of the components, it is first necessary to analyze 
whether the term rate series and their components have unit roots. The tests to check the 
presence of a unit root in all the series are presented in Table 3. Thus, using up to the 10% 
significance level, we fail to reject the null of unit root in each series.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Given the presence of unitary roots on the level in all the series, we proceed to test 
for the presence of a cointegration relation between the short-term and each component of 
the forward rate. Using Johnasen’s (1991) cointegration tests, we find in Table 4 that the 
forward rate cointegrates with the short-term interest rate and each of the components, the 
real neutral rate, the long-term expected inflation and the aggregated risk premium.
3 The 
hypothesis that there is a relation of cointegration is rejected individually in relation to all 
the components.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
  Taking into consideration the above results, regressions were estimated in levels 
using as an independent variable the forward rates and the short-term interest rate and each 
factor component of the forward rate individually as explanatory variables. The results are 
displayed in Table 5. Looking at the R
2 values, and considering only the variables that 
cointegrate with the forward rate, the results point to the high explanatory power of the risk 
premium. Real neutral rates seems to play a secondary role in explaining forward rates, 
while expected inflation rates do not have an important role. Finally, we find evidence of a 
positive relationship between short-term interest rates and forward rates. As expected, the 
                                                 
3 One possibility for finding no cointegration relationship with the inflationary risk premium and the 
macroeconomic fundamentals risk premium may be due to the fact that we have a shorter sample for these 
two series.  10 
 
conundrum effect observed in the 2003–2004 tightening monetary policy episode, where 
this relationship is negative, is the exception not the common case. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
5 – Conclusion 
  This article has analyzed the impacts of monetary policies on the Brazilian term 
structure by focusing on three episodes of monetary policy tightening, 2002/2003, 
2004/2005 and 2008, with the continuous increase in the short-term monetary policy 
interest rate, the Selic. The decomposition of long-term rates has allowed us to explain how 
these three episodes had an impact on the various components of the long-term rates. 
         The results show that, in all the events of policy tightening, increasing interest rates 
implied a fall in the risk premium. Regarding the final effect of two-year interest rates and 
forward rates, we had different results in each episode: a sharp decrease in the first episode, 
the conundrum effect in the second and an increase in the last one. Concerning the analysis 
of the determinant factors of the term rates, the almost-total importance of the risk premium 
to explain the variations in the term rates in Brazil was clear. Real neutral interest rates 
present a secondary contribution. 
In a final thought, we conclude that this paper contributes to understanding links 
between the monetary policy and the determinants of long-term interest rates. In our 
application to the Brazilian economy, we observe that monetary policy episodes were 
successful in reducing the risk premium and the real neutral interest rate from 2002 to the 
beginning of 2009, improving the credibility of Brazil’s Central Bank to control inflation. 
In spite of this, the hypothesis that this improved credibility is strongly biased cannot be 
excluded because it happened in a period of relative macroeconomic stability. In the future, 
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statisitcs
Series Mean Maximum Minimum
Short-term interest rate - Selic 16.8 4.1 26.50 11.25 1751
One-year interest rate 17.3 5.0 32.69 10.69 1751
Two-year interest rate 17.9 6.1 39.28 10.35 1751
Forward rate (year 1 to 2) 18.5 7.4 46.20 9.77 1751
Real Neutral Rate 7.6 1.7 10.17 4.58 1751
Long-Term expected inflation 4.8 0.9 8.00 3.74 1751
Risk Premium 5.1 5.3 27.77 0.31 1751
Risk-Premium - Inflation 1.7 1.2 6.43 -0.70 1302





Note: The full sample, 1751 observations, has irregular daily data from 1/2/2002 to 2/10/2009, the smaller 




Table 2 - Monetary policy tightening episodes - 2002:01 - 2009:02
Episode Date Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆
Start 15-Oct-02 18.00% 37.02% 43.48% 9.19% 4.80% 25.39%
Mid-point 21-Nov-02 22.00% 4.00% 36.33% -0.69% 42.39% -1.09% 8.42% -0.76% 6.78% 1.98% 22.99% -2.40%
End 20-Feb-03 26.50% 8.50% 32.30% -4.72% 35.34% -8.14% 8.36% -0.83% 7.71% 2.92% 15.96% -9.44%
Start 16-Sep-04 16.00% 18.18% 18.59% 8.63% 5.21% 3.76%
Mid-point 16-Dec-04 17.75% 1.75% 17.11% -1.07% 16.62% -1.97% 8.60% -0.03% 5.03% -0.18% 2.25% -1.52%
End 19-May-05 19.75% 3.75% 17.82% -0.36% 16.66% -1.93% 9.65% 1.02% 4.81% -0.40% 1.51% -2.25%
Start 17-Apr-08 11.25% 13.42% 13.95% 4.98% 4.16% 4.21%
Mid-point 5-Jun-08 12.25% 1.00% 14.44% 1.02% 14.97% 1.02% 5.14% 0.16% 4.41% 0.25% 4.73% 0.52%
End 11-Sep-08 13.75% 2.50% 14.49% 1.07% 14.39% 0.44% 5.72% 0.74% 4.50% 0.34% 3.54% -0.67%
Monetary Policy 
Rate  Forward Rate Expected Inflation Risk Premium Real Neutral Rate
Two-year interest 
rate
Note: The tightening monetary policy episode is defined by an increase minimum of 100 basis points on the monetary policy interest rate. The start date is the day of the first increase and the last 




Table 3 - Unit Root Tests 
Series T-stat P-Value T-stat P-Value
Short-term interest rate - Selic -0.962 0.768 -0.596 0.869
Forward rate (year 1 to 2) -1.359 0.604 -1.532 0.517
Real Neutral Rate -0.325 0.919 -0.305 0.922
Long-Term expected inflation -2.215 0.201 -2.370 0.151
Risk Premium -1.764 0.399 -1.955 0.307
Risk-Premium - Inflation -1.907 0.329 -2.118 0.238
Risk-Premium - Fundamentals -1.004 0.754 -1.226 0.665










Short-term interest rate - Selic 38.19 *** 3.94  
Real Neutral Rate 20.09 * 1.93  
Long-Term expected inflation 23.59 ** 6.50  
Risk-Premium 40.05 *** 3.07  
Risk-Premium - Inflation 13.87   3.59  
Risk-Premium - Fundamentals 9.54   1.91  
None  At Most 1
Note: Johansen cointegration tests were based on the assumption of a constant and no 
trend in the estimation equation. Asterisks, ***, **, * denote rejection of the null at 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels.
Table 4 - Cointegration with the Forward Rate - Johansen 





Explanatory Variable Coeficient R
2
Short-term interest rate - Selic 1.13 0.44
(0.09)
Real Neutral Rate 1.97 0.54
(0.13)




Risk-Premium - Inflation 1.29 0.83
(0.04)
Risk-Premium - Fundamentals -0.99 0.32
(0.10)
Note: We ran a simple least squares regressions with a constant for each 
explanatory variable. Asterisks, ***, **, * denote rejection of the null at 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels.
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Figure 2 – Decomposition of the forward rate – full sample – January 2, 2002 to 



















Figure 3 – Decomposition of the forward rate – sub-sample – October 23, 2003 to 
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